

The Influence of Insecurity, Threatened Masculinity, and Islam on Men's Gender Attitudes in the Middle East and North Africa

Sociological and psychological research on men in Western countries finds that men feel threatened when they cannot live up to masculine ideals in their societies. In response to “masculinity threat,” men can react with exaggerated displays of masculinity. This often leads to maltreatment of others who do not enact masculine ideals, such as women and homosexuals (Bosson et al. 2009; Franchina, Eisler, and Moore 2001; Glick et al. 2007; Kimmel 2004; Vandello et al. 2008; Willer et al. 2013). To build upon scholarship on threatened masculinity in the West and burgeoning scholarship on masculinity in predominantly Muslim countries (Baobaid 2006; Dahlgren 2010; Doumato 1992; Ghannam 2013; Ghoussoub and Sinclair-Webb 2006; Inhorn 2004; Juergensmeyer 2003; Moghadam 1994; Naguib 2015; Ouzgane 2006), we examine whether living in positions of insecurity, which may threaten men's ability to attain masculine ideals, is related to men's patriarchal gender ideology across predominantly Muslim countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

Even though Muslim men who undergo economic, political and/or physical insecurity in the MENA region may experience masculinity threat and overcompensate with stronger support for patriarchal gender attitudes, their ideology may also swing the other direction. Indeed, other evidence suggests that during times of economic and political uncertainty, patriarchal gender norms may be undermined. Women may have the opportunity to take advantage of new opportunities for civic, political, and economic participation (Cha and Thébaud 2009; Johansson-Nogues 2013).

Using (2011) Arab Barometer data, we investigate whether insecurity is linked to patriarchal gender attitudes among men in four predominantly Muslim Arab MENA countries (Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen) in the midst of the Arab Spring. We test whether different

kinds of insecurity, including economic insecurity, feeling unsafe, and political inefficacy, are related to support for patriarchal attitudes.

We then investigate whether elements of Islamic religiosity better predict patriarchal gender ideology than insecurity, or if they mediate the effect of insecurity on patriarchal attitudes. Some scholarship suggests that men in liminal, insecure positions are more likely join conservative religious movements which object to gender egalitarianism (Juergensmeyer 2003; Tessler 1997). Men's Islamic religiosity and their adherence to conservative forms of Islam in particular, have been linked to less support for gender egalitarianism (Author 2010; Davis and Robinson 2006; Moaddel 2006). Thus, research on masculine insecurity, men's Islamic religiosity and gender attitudes in the MENA region suggests that insecurity may indirectly lead to patriarchal attitudes via Islamic religiosity.

Ultimately, our results point to the pervasive influence of political Islam on MENA men's gender ideology with respect to women. During a period of heightened civic unrest in the four countries under investigation, we also see different relationships between insecurity, Islam, and men's gender ideology by country.

Hegemonic Masculinity and Overcompensation

Over the past 25 years, scholars have developed a considerable body of research on hegemonic masculinity in the West. Hegemonic masculinity refers to the dominant normative ideal of masculine behavior in a particular context (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005: 832). In a patriarchal society, hegemonic masculinity legitimizes the "dominant position of men and the subordination of women" (Connell 2005:77). States and other institutions often create and control ideals of hegemonic masculinity (Cleaver 2002; Connell 2003; Schrock and Schwalbe 2009).

It is important to recognize that in any given context, multiple masculinities exist and can influence people's lives in a number of ways (Coles 2009; Pascoe 2005). However, evidence abounds throughout the world showing how many men continue to try to perform hegemonic masculinity (Pyke 1996; Schrock and Schwalbe 2009; Vandello et al. 2008; Willer et al. 2013).

Masculinity theorists maintain that hegemonic masculinity is difficult for many men to attain. Masculinity is a precarious, anxiety-ridden, dramaturgical performance for men which requires continual social validation (Goffman 1977; Pascoe 2005; Schrock and Schwalbe 2009; Vandello et al. 2008; West and Zimmerman 1987). Because men with less resources or power are subject to the same hegemonic norms as others, failure to live up to masculine ideals can induce stress and anxiety. This can lead men to react by exercising hyper-masculinity as a means of overcompensating for their perceived lack of power (Pyke 1996; Schrock and Schwalbe 2009; Vandello et al. 2008; Willer et al. 2013).

Men may overcompensate in a number of ways (Brines 1994; Hoang and Yeoh 2011; Maass et al. 2003). In reaction to masculinity threat, men may exhibit extreme, aggressive displays of masculinity which degrade women and homosexuals (Babl 1979; Bosson et al. 2009; Franchina et al. 2001; Glick et al. 2007; Kimmel 2004; Vandello et al. 2008; Willer et al. 2013). Men supported by female breadwinners may react by retaining patriarchal gender norms and by doing less housework (Brines 1994; Deutsch and Saxon 1998). Other men put in more hours of work when their wives earn more per hour to retain their breadwinner status (Deutsch and Saxon 1998). Unemployed men are also more likely to perpetrate domestic violence and harassment than others (Maass et al. 2003; Macmillan and Gartner 1999).

Overall, research on masculinity threat and overcompensation suggests that men in positions which threaten their ability to enact hegemonic masculinity will be more likely to

overcompensate by supporting hegemonic patriarchal gender ideology. However, research on masculinity in various parts of the world suggests that during times of social, political, and economic instability, women may be treated more equally or gain opportunities they did not have during more stable times. For example, men who depend upon their wives for financial support intermittently or for extended periods of time may also, consequently, support more egalitarian gender ideology (Cha and Thébaud 2009; Gerson 1993; Zuo and Tang 2000).

Alternatively, in the MENA region in particular, in times of political and economic turmoil, some women have become more involved in public, political affairs. For example, during the Iranian Revolution, the Algerian War of Independence, and the Arab Spring in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, some women became very involved in political activism (Ghosh 2012; Johansson-Nogues 2013). While such involvement can raise awareness of women's courage and many skillsets, it also can provoke counter-movements and direct violence from the state and other groups (Burleigh 2013).

In this paper, we test whether men occupying insecure positions— which make it difficult to live up to hegemonic masculine ideals of strength, virility, and gendered expectations that men serve as leaders and providers of their families in predominantly Muslim MENA countries (Doumato 1992; Inhorn 2004; Juergensmeyer 2003; Miles 2002) — have more support for patriarchal gender ideology. In doing so we additionally bring into question whether a one-size-fits-all masculinity theory, based on a single idea of masculinity, is useful for understanding masculinities cross-nationally.

Women's Rights in the MENA Region

Many social currents influence gender ideology in predominantly Muslim MENA countries. Although active feminist movements and some improvements in legal rights and

education for women have occurred in the MENA region in the last several decades, it is still known for having a high degree of gender inequality internationally (Afkhami et al. 1998; Kelly 2010; Miles 2002; Moghadam 2002, 2004; The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2012). Gender inequality results from a convergence of state structure and influence, patriarchal Arab culture, and Islamist movements' gender ideology.

In many predominantly Muslim nations, gender is inherently political. Patriarchal culture, symbolized by the gendered segmentation of public space, fewer rights, and increased risks for women, is upheld by many states and Islamist movements within the region as an intrinsic part of post-colonial national and religious identity. In some countries, such as Algeria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, Islamic identity has been used as a basis for collective political identity that unifies citizens under the state's rule, especially during times of civil unrest (Allabadi 2008; Doumato 1992; Jafar 2005; Moghadam 1994). The state's ability to maintain Islamic culture legitimizes their authority to rule as a protector of Islam. As a result, notable disparities between men and women's rights, their involvement in politics, labor force participation, and education continue to exist (Doumato 1992; Kelly 2010; The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2012).

Table 1 presents the indicators of gender inequality in Yemen, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia using the World Economic Forum and the Human Development Index reports in 2011. Of the countries in our study, Yemen has the most gender inequality according to some reports (Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi 2011; U.N. Human Development Report 2011). In the World Economic Forum's (2011) cross-national comparison of gender gaps, Yemen ranked the worst of 135 countries in terms of women's economic participation, and nearly last in terms of female

educational attainment, second only to Chad. It also ranked nearly last in terms of women's political empowerment (Hausmann et al. 2011).

Table 1. Indicators of Gender Inequality in Yemen, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia, 2011.

	Yemen	Egypt	Algeria	Tunisia
World Economic Forum				
Overall Gender Gap Score	0.4873 (135)	0.5933 (123)	0.5991 (121)	0.6225 (108)
Women Economic Participation Score	0.3180 (135)	0.4753 (122)	0.4452 (124)	0.4440 (126)
Women Educational Attainment Score	0.6420 (134)	0.9081 (110)	0.9502 (96)	0.9641 (94)
Women Health and Survival Score	0.9727 (83)	0.9768 (52)	0.9661 (107)	0.9641 (110)
Women Political Empowerment Score	0.0164 (131)	0.0311 (126)	0.0350 (124)	0.1278 (69)
Human Development Index				
Overall Gender Inequality Index Score	0.769 (146)	0.412 (71)	0.293 (45)
Women's Seats in National Parliament (% of Total)	0.7%	.. ²	7.0%	23.3%
Proportion of Women with at Least Secondary Education	7.6%	43.4%	36.3%	33.5%
Women Labor Force Participation Rate	19.9%	22.4%	37.2%	25.6%

When available, country ranks are presented in parenthesis.

² The People's Assembly and the Shoura Assembly were dissolved by the Egypt Supreme Council of Armed Forces on 13 February 2011.

Conditions for women in Yemen have deteriorated in recent years due to political insecurity. Women are subject to considerable discrimination, restrictions and abuse (Baobaid 2006; Kelly 2010). Violence against women “is considered “normal” by large portions of Yemeni society,” and condoned by law (Baobaid 2006:162). Women do not expect help from police or other government institutions, which tend to empathize more with the male family member who likely hit them (Baobaid 2016).

Yet there are many ways to rate and rank women’s experiences and challenges. In Egypt, for example, women continue to experience life as “nasty and brutish” (Burleigh 2013). A (2013) UNICEF survey found over 27 million Egyptian women (91% of those between the ages of 15 and 49) had survived female genital mutilation. Another report from the UN Entity for Gender Equality (2013) found 99.3 % of surveyed Egyptian women had experienced a form of sexual violence (c.f. Burleigh 2013). Despite the shocking prevalence of sexual violence, there are no medical protocols for rape and few victims go to the hospital. Reporting sexual violence to the police is an even worse option, as police have been reported to treat victims like prostitutes (Burleigh 2013).

Given the variation in how women are treated in the geographically and culturally expansive MENA region, it is important to move beyond over-simplistic representations of predominantly Muslim nations uniformly oppressing women (Johansson-Nogues 2013). A number of states, such as Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia, have implemented programs to increase women’s rights in order to display their progressive, modern tendencies, keep foreign investors and donors at bay, and to contribute to economic development (Ghosh 2012; Grami 2008; Mulrine 2011:13). Women’s advancement has been part of Tunisia’s and Egypt’s economic development programming since the 1950s. Egyptian women gained the right to vote and run for

political office in 1956; Tunisia followed in 1957. These legal reforms of women's rights occurred earlier than in many other predominantly Muslim and African nations. However, it is in Algeria where women have the highest rates of labor force participation of all the countries we examine (Ghosh 2012).

Women's rights in the private sphere vary across our sample. In 1956, polygamy was abolished in Tunisia, and equal rights were granted to women in marriage, divorce, and child custody. Similar to Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, Abdel Gamal Nasser sought women's rights in marriage, divorce and child custody in Egypt, but failed due to opposition from Islamic clergy. Hosni Mubarak later introduced minor reforms for women's personal status laws, including some guarantees for women with regards to divorce, child custody, and alimony. Algeria also has strived to increase women's rights in recent years. However, similar to Egypt, under pressure from Islamic clergy, Algerian women continue to have unequal status to men in nationality and family law (Freedom House 2005).

Despite advancements in public policy to improve women's rights, support from political leaders for gender equality has been intermittent. To counteract a number of women's movements and international pressure to advance women's rights (Author 2010; Moghadam 2002), various Islamist clergy and movements have been vocal in opposing women's rights initiatives. Governments, such as Egypt's, have actively contributed to gender inequality by indicating to women that their voices are unwanted in politics and the public sphere, and that should they be harmed in the midst of a protest, it is their fault (Burleigh 2013).

Amid national and international debates, women in all the countries we examine have continued to face discrimination in legal processes, restriction in personal freedoms, and domestic violence. Women's rights in each country are, of course, influenced by socioeconomic

status, urban/rural location, and various other factors as well (Ghannam 2013; Johansson-Nogues 2013).

Masculinity and Islam

Muslim men in the MENA region have been portrayed in the media and in some scholarship as adhering to masculinity that is tied to honor, national identity, various patriarchal characteristics (such as competency, control, strength, a protector status, a breadwinner status, and fatherhood) (Baobaid 2006; Dahlgren 2010; Doumato 1992; Inhorn 2004; Juergensmeyer 2003; Moghadam 1994), as well as oppressing women (Baobaid 2006; Ghannam 2013:4-5). However, burgeoning scholarship on masculinity in the MENA region reveals the many kinds of masculinities embodied by men in the MENA region (Ghannam 2013; Ghoussoub and Sinclair-Webb 2006; Inhorn 2004; Naguib 2015; Ouzgane 2006).

Despite the varied masculinities men may have, some evidence continues to suggest that MENA men are aware of hegemonic conceptions of men, and seek to live up to them to avoid being stigmatized by others (Ghannam 2013; Miles 2002). In doing so, they may deliberately circumscribe women's roles in both subtle and substantial ways. For example, in her research on masculinity in Egypt, Farha Ghannam (2013) provides the example of Muhsen, who was uncomfortable with his working wife, because he thought it signified his inability to fulfill his breadwinning role. Consequently, as overcompensation theory would predict, he deliberately undermined her efforts to do it all. He "made a point of not helping her with any household chores." When she looked "exhausted or when she uttered the slightest complaint about the work she had to do, he would simply state that she could stop working if she was too tired or if she could not balance her duties as a wife, a mother, and an employee" (Ghannam 2013: 97).

In an excerpt from a focus group of men in a low-income area of Jordan, men suggested that if their wives made more than them, they would feel threatened and humiliated. “If she gives him a hard time, he might ask her to quit her job [or] people will influence the husband and make him ask his wife to quit work to save his dignity,” one man explained (Miles 2002). When these men were asked to respond to a case of an unemployed man with an employed wife, they said “the husband would feel inferior” and that this may lead to his divorcing his wife (Miles 2002).

These accounts suggest that there may be a direct relationship between men’s perception that they are not fulfilling hegemonic masculine roles – which may be especially difficult to attain during difficult economic historical moments – and men’s support for patriarchal gender ideology. In particular, MENA Muslim men who rely on income from employed spouses may be particularly likely to support patriarchal gender ideology as a way to overcompensate for a threatened sense of masculinity.

With our quantitative, cross-national analysis on men’s gender ideology, we seek to build upon these different streams of research on masculinity in the MENA region by examining whether men in positions that may jeopardize their ability to perform hegemonic masculinity tend adhere to a uniform patriarchal form of masculinity, characterized by overcompensation and circumscribed female gender roles. Alternatively, it is also possible that multiple relationships between insecurity and gender attitudes manifest in our cross-country comparison.

Other research suggests that occupying insecure positions may be indirectly related to support for patriarchal gender role ideology via Islamic religiosity. Based on cross-national comparisons across the globe, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2004) conclude that people who live in conditions of insecurity are more likely to be religious. Their theory suggests this occurs at a national level based on the extent of human development, and at an individual level

for people experiencing various kinds of insecurity on a daily basis. So according to their theory, in safe, secure, developed countries there will be lower levels of religiosity and among at-risk populations there will be higher levels of religiosity. Their theory also associates increased support for gender equality and sexual diversity with young people throughout the world living in countries experiencing development — with the exception of predominantly Muslim countries (Norris and Inglehart 2002). They suggest Muslim religious culture is related to more patriarchal attitudes (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2004). However, they do not test if Islamic religiosity mediates the influence of insecurity on gender attitudes, or more specifically if specific variants of fundamentalist or political Islam most influence gender ideology.

Some qualitative research on Islamic groups in the Middle East supports Norris and Inglehart's (2004) theory by suggesting that young men in the region stuck in liminal, insecure economic or political positions are particularly likely to join conservative Islamic movements (Juergensmeyer 2003; Tessler 1997). Other research suggests that religious Muslim men, and fundamentalist or orthodox men in particular, are likely to have patriarchal gender attitudes (Afkhami et al. 1998; Kucinskas 2010; Davis and Robinson 2006; Jafar 2007; Moaddel 2006). Thus, research on the region suggests that insecurity could indirectly, via conservative strains of Islam, lead to support for more patriarchal gender attitudes.

It remains unclear if insecurity directly and/or indirectly leads to patriarchal attitudes among populations of men in the predominantly Muslim MENA countries. The aforementioned research leads one to expect that among men, various forms of insecurity will either be (1) directly related to patriarchal attitudes as a form of overcompensation for feelings of inadequacy or humiliation, or (2) indirectly related to patriarchal gender attitudes via Islamic religiosity (or more specifically, (3) conservative political variants of Islam) which provide them with solace in

the face of uncertain living conditions. It is also possible that (4) during times of social and political unrest, patriarchal gender ideology is undermined.

This study advances the literature on masculinity and gender equality attitudes by bringing together various literatures on masculinity in the West and in predominantly Muslim MENA countries. To build upon these different streams of research, we test the relationship between insecure living conditions, Islamic religiosity and gender ideology among men in four predominantly Muslim MENA countries. We specify between political, economic, and physical conditions of insecurity to test whether particular kinds of insecurity are related to support for patriarchal attitudes. In addition, we parse out four different facets of Islamic religiosity, including support for political Islam.

Data and Methods

We use nationally-representative data on four Muslim majority MENA countries from the second (2011) wave of the Arab-Barometer. The Arab Barometer was established in 2005 to learn about ordinary citizens' political attitudes in the MENA region. Arab Barometer data were collected through a partnership between scholars at the University of Michigan, Princeton University, and the Arab Reform Initiative.¹ For the purposes of this paper, we use data from countries in the midst of the Arab Spring, during the first half of 2011, in order to investigate the relationship between conditions of heightened insecurity, Islam, and gender.²

We recognize that these countries vary in their cultural, economic, political, and theological history (Charrad 2011), as discussed above. They also have different political and

¹ More details on the Arab Barometer are available at the following website:
<http://www.arabbarometer.org/content/about-center>

² We present models using data from the second (rather than the third) wave of the Arab Barometer because it includes questions on more facets of gender ideology.

economic systems, and various internal demographic patterns (Tessler 2010). The Arab Barometer's primary investigators created the survey with a "most different systems" research design, with the intention that similar findings across dissimilar contexts would increase confidence that these findings would be generalizable across the region (Tessler 2010). For the purposes of this paper, we analyze patterns in a pooled model across all included countries, as well as within separate models by country and by gender, to assess whether similar patterns exist across countries.

The countries we examine are for the most part ranked as having similar levels of civic and political freedom according to Freedom House's Freedom in the World Report (2011). Nearly all of the countries in our sample were ranked "Not Free" in 2011. On a scale of 1 to 7 (1=Best and 7=Worst), Tunisia was ranked highest (worst) with a Freedom Rating of 6, a Civil Liberties score of 5, and a Political Rights score of 7. Algeria had a Freedom Rating of 5.5, a Civil Liberties score of 5, and a Political Rights score of 6. Egypt and Yemen both had Freedom ratings of 5.5, Civil Liberties scores of 5, and Political Rights scores of 6.

We account for how the countries in our sample vary by level of human development (as measured by the United Nation's Human Development Index (HDI), which is based on life expectancy at birth, mean adult education, expected years of schooling, and gross national income (GNI) per capita). Tunisia (94th of 187 ranked countries) and Algeria (96th) were tied with the highest human development (.698) scores of all the countries in our sample in 2011. However, the UN Human Development Report assessed Tunisia as "High Human Development" and Algeria at a stage of "Medium Human Development." Egypt (113th) had a rating of .644, indicating "Medium Human Development." Yemen (154th) had the lowest standard of living (HDI "Low" at .462 in 2011). Yemen has low educational attainment, high rates of illiteracy, and

limited job opportunities compared to other countries in the region and to other countries across the world (Assaad et al. 2009).

Our sample includes data from face-to-face interviews with Muslim men aged 18 years and older from Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen. Because we focus on masculinity among Muslim men ($N=2,378$), we drop women and non-Muslims from our analyses. Our final sample ($N=2,214$) also excludes missing observations on the dependent variable (110 men) and on variables with less than 1% of the observations missing. We use multiple imputation in Stata 13 for explanatory and control variables assessed to have missing at random (MAR) observations by preliminary tests.

Dependent Variable

Men and women in the sample were asked to respond to statements on women's participation in politics, in the workforce, in education, as well as on women's right to travel according to a four-point Likert scale with responses ranging from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (4). To measure the dependent variable of support for *patriarchal gender ideology*, we aggregate the following measures into a summated scale, with high values representing patriarchal gender views: "A woman can become prime minister or president of a Muslim state," "A married woman can work outside the home," "In general, men are better at political leadership than women," "University education for males is more important than university education for females," and "It is permissible for a woman to travel abroad by herself." These questions load on a single scale with a Cronbach's alpha of .66.³

Key Independent Variables

³ Pre-imputation analysis demonstrated that a summated scale provided a better fit for our models than a measure from factor analysis.

To assess whether men feel insecure in ways that could threaten hegemonic ideals of controlled and competent masculinity, symbolized by “breadwinner” or “protector” roles, we include measures of perceived economic insecurity, unsafe living conditions, and political inefficacy. To assess *economic insecurity* for men, we use a self-assessment indicator in which respondents describe if their household income covers their expenses and if they are able to save (0) or if they face difficulties in meeting their needs (1). We additionally incorporate whether respondents are *unemployed* (1) or not (0).⁴ To examine whether men’s spouses contribute to household income, we include *spousal employment* by recoding spousal occupation (1=spouse employed, 0=unemployed). It is important to acknowledge that some men may falsely report women’s work, particularly if their wives work in the black market (Hoodfar 1997: 8; Singerman 1995)

To assess whether respondents feel *personally unsafe and insecure*, respondents were asked “Do you currently feel that your own personal as well as your family’s safety and security are ensured or not?” We recode responses into a binary variable indicating if respondents feel that their personal safety and security are ensured (0=fully ensured or ensured) or not (1=not ensured or absolutely not ensured).

To measure respondents’ sense of *political inefficacy*—or a perceived lack of personal political agency in their country—we create a summated scale from the following standardized variables: “Citizens have the ability to influence government policies,” “People can join non-political organizations without fear,” and “To what extent is freedom to join political organizations guaranteed.” These variables are based on a four-point Likert scale with responses

⁴ We distinguished unemployed men from students and retired men. We did not include income measures due to missing observations (38% missing for individual income (with 71% missing in Algeria), and 29% for household income).

ranging from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (4). They are coded so that higher values indicate a lack of political efficacy. We also include the standardized binary variable “In your opinion, are people nowadays free to criticize the government without fear” (1=disagree). These questions load on a single scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.69.⁵

We measure Islamic religiosity based on whether respondents *self-identify as religious* (1=yes, 0=somewhat religious or not religious), *pray daily* (1=always or most of the time) or not (0=sometimes, rarely, or never), or *read or listen to the Quran* (1=always or most of the time, 0=sometimes, rarely or never).⁶

Finally, we create a summated scale measuring men’s attitudes towards *political Islam* using twelve standardized questions. Higher values on the scale represent the belief that Islam should play a greater role in politics and governance. We include four questions regarding opinions on the country’s laws and regulations (on a four-point Likert scale, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree): “The government and parliament should enact: (1) laws, (2) penal laws, (3) personal status laws, and (4) inheritance laws, in accordance with Islamic laws.” We supplement these measures with six additional questions (on the same Likert scale) that are recoded so that larger values represent a belief in a greater role of religion in politics: “Religious leaders should not interfere in voters’ decisions in elections,” “Your country is better off if religious people hold public positions in the state,” “Religious leaders should have influence over government decisions,” “Religious practices are private and should be separated from social and

⁵ A summated scale had a better fit than a measure from factor analysis.

⁶ The Arab Barometer’s questionnaire included more variables on religious practices including measuring fasting, reading/watching religious materials, attending religious lessons, attending Friday prayer and reading religious books. These variables weaken each other due to high collinearity. The three variables presented had the strongest and most robust relationship with gender ideology.

political life,” “Religious associations and institutions should not influence voter’s decisions in elections,” and “Mosques should not be used for election campaigning.” Finally, we include two questions on the belief that the following political systems are appropriate for the respondent’s own country, with responses on a four-point Likert scale (ranging from absolutely inappropriate to very appropriate): “A parliamentary system in which only Islamist parties compete in elections,” and “A system governed by Islamic law without elections or political parties.” These twelve questions were standardized before creating a summated scale with an alpha of 0.75.

Control Variables

We add control variables that have been shown to affect men’s gender ideology (Cha and Thébaud 2009, Johansson-Nogues 2013): *age* (in years), *university education* (1= has a B.A., or M.A., or above, 0=does not have university education), and *marital status* (1=not married, 0=married). We also include if the respondent lives in a *rural* (1) or urban (0) area.

Finally, to control for country-level differences in development and economic conditions, we add to our models the *Human Development Index (HDI)* scores for each country from the United Nations Development Programme’s (2011) Human Development Report.

Results

We present descriptive statistics in Table 2. In the four MENA countries we examine, men on average tend to agree with patriarchal gender attitudes ($\mu=2.72$). Descriptive statistics also illustrate the pervasiveness of economic and physical insecurity, as well as the high levels of religiosity across the region. Country-specific statistics are presented in Table 3 and reveal much variation in economic insecurity, unsafety, and religiosity.

A considerable proportion of men live in conditions of economic and physical insecurity. A majority of men, 70%, believe their income cannot cover their expenses. This varies by

country. In contrast to the half of Algerian men whom experience economic insecurity, a large majority of Yemeni men (83%) struggle to meet their economic needs. About 15% of men in our sample are unemployed. Unemployment ranges from 8% of Egyptian men sampled, to 21% of Tunisian men. About one in ten men have a spouse who contributes to household income. In addition to widespread perceived economic insecurity, over two fifths of men think their family's safety is not ensured. About a third of Tunisian men feel unsafe, compared to nearly half of Egyptian men (48%).

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for MENA Muslim Men in Yemen, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia (N=2214)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>St. Dev</i>	<i>Range</i>
Patriarchal Gender Ideology	2.72	0.60	1-4
Insecurity			
Economic Insecurity ¹	0.70		0-1
Unemployed	0.15		0-1
Spouse Employed	0.11		0-1
Unsafe ¹	0.42		0-1
Political Inefficacy ²	0.01	0.72	-1.00-2.06
Religiosity			
Self-Identified Religious ¹	0.32		0-1
Prays Daily ¹	0.85		0-1
Reads or Listens to the Quran ¹	0.56		0-1
Political Islam ²	0.00	0.51	-1.70-1.94
Demographics			
Age	38.54	14.34	18-85
University Education	0.22		0-1
Not Married	0.35		0-1
Rural	0.46		0-1
Human Development Index	0.63	0.10	0.46-0.70

Source: Arab Barometer 2010-2011

¹ These variables were also tested using their original categorical coding. However, recoding them into binaries did not lead to substantive differences in the models and provides easier interpretations.

² For our Political Inefficacy and Political Islam scales, we use standardized statistics for the original variables because of their different structures and distributions.

Most men are on the lower spectrum of the political inefficacy scale. Therefore, most men believe that they can influence politics. Algerian and Yemeni men have the highest scores on the political inefficacy scale, which suggests they think they have the least power to influence their government. Egyptian men have the greatest sense of political efficacy.

Table 3. Country-level Averages/Proportions for MENA Muslims Men

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Yemen</i>	<i>Egypt</i>	<i>Algeria</i>	<i>Tunisia</i>
Patriarchal Gender Ideology	2.72	3.06	2.60	2.50
Insecurity				
Economically Insecure	0.83	0.79	0.50	0.68
Unemployed	0.15	0.08	0.17	0.21
Spouses Employed	0.09	0.10	0.13	0.10
Feel Unsafe	0.44	0.48	0.46	0.32
Political Inefficacy	0.29	-0.49	0.42	-0.16
Religiosity				
Self-Identified Religious	0.44	0.42	0.24	0.17
Pray Daily	0.94	0.95	0.91	0.62
Read or Listen to Quran	0.68	0.75	0.30	0.51
Political Islam	0.34	-0.02	-0.04	-0.28
Demographics				
Age	34.02	40.95	37.97	40.91
University Education	0.35	0.23	0.16	0.17
Not Married	0.28	0.19	0.51	0.39
Rural	0.65	0.57	0.30	0.33
Human Development Index	0.46	0.64	0.70	0.70
<i>N</i>	<i>534</i>	<i>573</i>	<i>540</i>	<i>567</i>

About a third of Muslim MENA men sampled identify as religious and most men practice religious behavior. About 85 percent of men report praying daily always or often. A majority of men in our total sample (about 56%) reads or listens to the Quran always or often.

However, religiosity varies greatly by country. Tunisian men tend to be less religious than men in other countries. Yemeni and Egyptian men rank among the most religious. Only 17% of Tunisian men self-identify as religious, compared to 44% of Yemeni men and 42% of Egyptian men. While over 90% of men in Yemen, Egypt and Algeria pray daily at least most of the time, only 62% of men in Tunisia report praying daily. The majority of men in Egypt,

Tunisia, and Yemen read the Quran often. Only 30% of Algerian men frequently read the Quran. In terms of political Islam, men in Tunisia believe, on average, that Islam should have a much lesser role in politics. Yemeni men are far more likely to strongly support political Islam compared to men in the other countries.

We estimate how insecurity and Islamic religiosity are related to Muslim MENA men's gender attitudes using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression⁷ with two-tailed significance tests using sample weights.⁸ In Table 4, we first test whether men living in conditions of insecurity and political inefficacy are particularly likely to support patriarchal gender ideology (Model 1). Next, we investigate whether Islamic religiosity and belief in political Islam shape gender ideology (Models 2 and 3). Finally, we test if measures of religiosity mediate the relationship between insecurity and attitudes towards women (Model 4).⁹

At first glance, it appears that we have mixed results with regards to our overcompensation hypothesis in our pooled regional data. In our first model, there is some support for our prediction that men who live in conditions of insecurity are more likely to support patriarchal gender roles. MENA Muslim men living with economic and physical insecurity seem to have more patriarchal attitudes.

⁷ We cannot use hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to estimate the effects of individual-level vs. country-level variables on patriarchal gender attitudes because the small number of countries precludes this.

⁸ Because preliminary tests indicate heteroskedasticity, a robust heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator is used to produce robust t-statistics. VIF tests indicated there is not undue multi-collinearity.

⁹ We test each insecurity and religiosity variable separately in additional models. Results shown are robust across models.

Table 4. Robust and Weighted OLS Estimates for Patriarchal Gender Ideology for MENA Muslim Men (N=2214)

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>
Insecurity				
Economic Insecurity	0.131*** (4.27)			0.080** (2.80)
Unemployed	-0.057 (-1.46)			0.014 (0.36)
Spouse Employed	-0.106* (-2.18)			-0.140** (-3.09)
Unsafe	0.096*** (3.37)			0.106*** (3.98)
Political Inefficacy	-0.113*** (-5.44)			-0.109*** (-5.45)
Religiosity				
Self-Identified Religious		0.124*** (3.74)	0.065* (2.05)	0.066* (2.15)
Prays Daily		0.178*** (4.30)	0.083* (2.04)	0.109** (2.66)
Reads or Listens to the Quran		0.111*** (3.77)	0.073** (2.60)	0.052 (1.84)
Political Islam			0.356*** (12.99)	0.386*** (13.25)
Demographics				
Age				-0.004*** (-3.37)
University Education				-0.059 (-1.83)
Not Married				-0.160*** (-4.63)
Rural				0.048 (1.72)
Human Development Index				0.683*** (3.97)

t statistics in parentheses

Source: Arab Barometer 2010-2011

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

However, evidence suggests it is not true that men living in conditions of insecurity will support patriarchal gender ideology uniformly. MENA Muslim men who lack political power are significantly more gender egalitarian. There is not a strong relationship between men's unemployment and their gender attitudes. As might be predicted by some scholarship on

women's work (Cha and Thébaud 2009; Gerson 1993; Zuo and Tang 2000), men with employed spouses are more likely to support egalitarian gender roles.¹⁰

In our second pooled model, we find that all forms of Islamic religiosity (self-identified religiosity, prayer, and daily reading of the Quran) are related to Muslim MENA men's support for patriarchal gender ideology. Among the facets of Islamic religiosity we examine, we find in Model 3 that support for political Islam is the most important. Men who believe in political Islam have significantly more patriarchal gender attitudes than those who do not. This relationship remains strong and robust across all our models. Moreover, the significance and magnitude of the effects of other religious variables diminish when political Islam is included (Model 3). Therefore, while being religious, praying and reading the Quran may independently predict patriarchal gender ideology, their effects seem to be partially mediated by a belief in political Islam.

Model 4 suggests that Islam does not mediate the relationships between insecurity and patriarchal gender attitudes.¹¹ Instead of Islam explaining the relationship between feelings of insecurity and men's support for patriarchal gender ideology, we find that economic insecurity and being unsafe have independent relationships with patriarchal gender ideology.

However, when we assess relationships between insecurity, Islam, and gender ideology among men by country, the story dramatically changes; this is evident in Table 5. Across the board, we find that most prior results are not robust in country-specific models. We fail to find consistent support for overcompensation theory across all four countries. We do not find

¹⁰ We cannot include an interaction between being unemployed and having a spouse employed because only 23 of Arab Muslim men in our pooled sample fall in this category.

¹¹ We ran additional analysis including interactions between all insecurity and religiosity measures. These interactions either do not have a significant effect on gender ideology or lead to less patriarchal gender ideology.

widespread evidence that experiences of economic, physical, and political insecurity will lead to increased support for patriarchal gender ideology.¹²

Table 5. Robust and Weighted OLS Estimates for Patriarchal Gender Ideology for MENA Muslim Men by Country

	<i>Model 1: Yemen</i>	<i>Model 2: Egypt</i>	<i>Model 3: Algeria</i>	<i>Model 4: Tunisia</i>
Insecurity				
Economic Insecurity	-0.125* (-2.01)	0.024 (0.40)	-0.020 (-0.31)	0.149** (3.25)
Unemployed	0.042 (0.58)	0.103 (1.22)	-0.036 (-0.41)	0.058 (1.08)
Spouse Employed	0.022 (0.24)	-0.095 (-1.08)	-0.019 (-0.20)	-0.169* (-2.47)
Unsafe	-0.101 (-1.76)	0.069 (1.51)	0.102 (1.77)	0.099* (2.28)
Political Inefficacy	-0.027 (-0.68)	-0.038 (-0.73)	0.055 (1.35)	-0.097* (-2.44)
Religiosity				
Self-Identified Religious	-0.149** (-2.73)	0.132** (2.65)	0.105 (1.41)	0.085 (1.30)
Prays Daily	-0.133 (-0.82)	-0.038 (-0.32)	0.205* (2.34)	0.044 (0.91)
Reads or Listens to the Quran	0.149** (2.67)	-0.108* (-2.10)	0.034 (0.43)	-0.036 (-0.80)
Political Islam	0.484*** (7.99)	0.149** (2.68)	0.453*** (6.98)	0.308*** (5.95)
Demographics				
Age	-0.000 (-0.11)	-0.005** (-2.72)	0.006* (2.27)	-0.001 (-0.70)
University Education	-0.051 (-0.89)	-0.054 (-0.91)	-0.097 (-1.34)	-0.125* (-2.14)
Not Married	0.013 (0.20)	-0.246*** (-3.80)	0.133 (1.52)	-0.045 (-0.75)
Rural	-0.128* (-2.15)	-0.006 (-0.13)	0.114 (1.55)	0.021 (0.46)
<i>N</i>	534	573	540	567

t statistics in parentheses

Source: Arab Barometer 2010-2011

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

¹² All differences between countries discussed below were confirmed using F-tests to compare the difference in estimates between models. We are grateful to David Weakliem for his advice to use this test.

Instead, we see country-specific patterns. Tunisian men reside in one of the most economically developed and legally gender progressive countries in our sample. However, as Freedom House reports, citizens of the country had less political freedom in 2011 than the other three countries included. In this context, Tunisian men undergoing economic insecurity and living in unsafe conditions, are particularly likely to support patriarchal gender ideology. Yet, men most acutely aware of political inefficacy and men with employed spouses support more gender parity.

In Yemen, a country with the lowest ranked human development and the most gender inequality, men living in conditions of economic insecurity are more likely to be gender egalitarian. An F-test comparing the coefficient estimates between samples suggest that the effect of being unsafe in Yemen is significantly different than being unsafe in all other countries.

It is possible that relative deprivation, as evident in Tunisia, leads to overcompensation and a greater sense of masculinity threat, compared to widespread, long-standing, economic insecurity. It is also possible that men experiencing economic insecurity and unsafe living conditions are more likely to react against the gendered rhetoric of the state. The state of Tunisia has been more supportive of women's rights; yet under economic stress and unsafe conditions, men support more patriarchal gender attitudes. In contrast, in Yemen, which lacks legal gender equity, men facing economic insecurity are more gender egalitarian.

The relationship between religiosity and gender ideology is far more complicated by country than when looking at the pooled sample. In examining the effects of most facets of Islam on MENA men's gender ideology, difference, rather than similarity, is most striking. We find some support for the expectation that religious men would have greater support for patriarchal gender ideology. Some facets of Islam in certain contexts, such as Egyptian men's self-identified

religiosity, Yemeni men's self-professed frequent reading of the Quran, and Algerian men's reported daily prayer, are tied to greater patriarchal attitudes.¹³ Yet, in Yemen, self-identified religious men are more gender egalitarian. In Egypt, men who weekly read the Quran are less likely to have patriarchal gender attitudes than others.

The only consistent result by country is the positive effect of political Islam on patriarchal gender ideology. Across all countries, men's beliefs that Islam should influence politics and governance are associated with more patriarchal attitudes. This finding points to the importance of not only accounting for standard measures of religious belonging, belief and behavior, but also for the influence of politically-infused religious beliefs.

However, differences by country are apparent when comparing coefficients using F-tests. The effect of political Islam on gender ideology in Egypt is significantly smaller than in the other countries. The effect of political Islam in Tunisia is smaller than in Yemen and Algeria. Political Islam plays a role in shaping gender ideology across countries, but not in the same degree of magnitude.

The findings presented in Table 5 lead us to lose confidence in most of the results presented in Table 4. Our one robust, consistent finding across countries reveals the strong relationship between political Islam and men's patriarchal gender ideology. Instead of being able to identify region-specific patterns in relationships between various forms of insecurity, other facets of Islamic religiosity, and gender ideology, we find different results by country. Additional models on the effects of insecurity and Islam on Muslim women's gender ideology in the four included MENA countries (available upon request), show similarly disparate results by country.

Discussion

¹³ The effect of prayer in Algeria is not significantly different from the other countries.

In examining the relationship between insecurity, Islam, and patriarchal gender ideology during a period of heightened social, political and economic unrest during the 2011 Arab Spring, we find that the most consistent predictor of men's patriarchal gender ideology is political Islam. Aside of the influence of political Islam, relationships between insecurity (economic, safety, and political), Islamic belonging and behavior, and gender ideology vary by country in the Middle East and North Africa.

We suspect differences are due to each country's distinct histories, state structures and ideologies, religious systems, and economic systems. Contrary to our expectations based on masculinity threat and overcompensation theory, our results suggest that men who report living in economic insecurity and reside in the country with the most economic insecurity and the highest gender inequality of the four countries examined, Yemen, tend to have more egalitarian gender attitudes than others.

In contrast, for men in Tunisia, which has higher ratings of human development and histories of national government support for reducing gender inequality, experiencing economic insecurity is significantly associated with more patriarchal gender attitudes. These results offer some support for our hypothesis based on overcompensation theory that, under conditions of insecurity, some men may feel threatened and react with more inegalitarian gender attitudes.

Men experiencing the aforementioned kinds of insecurity may be reacting against the gendered rhetoric of the state. However, given the limited purview of our study, we cannot confidently draw such conclusions. Future research should examine whether, during times of unrest in the Middle East, unhappy citizens living with various forms of insecurity will tend to react against state rhetoric.

Our findings lend insight to scholarship on overcompensation and masculinity threat in the West and other regions as well. They encourage international scholars to examine the specific contexts and forms of masculinity which are tied to a sense of threatened masculinity and overcompensation – and to have a greater sensitivity to the contexts in which threatened masculinity do not lead to male overcompensation and enactment of patriarchal ideology.

We additionally examined whether Norris and Inglehart's (2004) argument that insecurity is related to increased religiosity held up in our countries of interest. We hypothesized that living in conditions of insecurity might lead to increased religiosity, which in turn would lead to higher support for patriarchal gender ideology. We find, contrary to Norris and Inglehart's theory and our hypothesis, that religiosity does not mediate the relationship between insecurity and gender ideology.

We do not find that Islamic identity and practices are related to MENA Muslim men's gender ideology in uniform ways across or within countries. For example, in Yemen, self-identified religiosity corresponds with less patriarchal gender ideology, but reading or listening to the Quran is associated with more support for patriarchal attitudes. In Egypt, we find the completely opposite relationship between religiosity and gender ideology. These findings underscore how the connection between MENA men's Islamic religiosity and gender ideology varies by location.

The one uniform pattern revealed in our analyses is the consistent relationship between support for political Islam and patriarchal gender attitudes. When we account for beliefs in a political Islam, the influence of Islamic belonging and practices diminishes. Our results reveal the importance of incorporating political forms of religious culture in studying international gender ideology. Cross-national research on religion and gender ideology needs to distinguish

between typically studied elements of religious belonging, belief, and behavior, from political religiosity. Our results suggest that in the MENA region, and likely in other regions, failing to account for political religious beliefs may lead scholars to misguided overgeneralizations about the impact of Islamic religiosity.

Although our findings largely do not provide support for most of the theories we proposed, they are important nonetheless. Ultimately our results undermine broad sweeping theories about the effects of insecurity and religion on gender ideology. Instead, we bring attention to the variation of men's experiences of insecurity, religion, and of their gender ideologies in the Middle East. Reporting null findings, such as our results on the varied relationships between insecurity, Islam, and gender ideology in the MENA region, is particularly important. This variation debunks blanket statements made in popular media and in many scholarly accounts about men's insecurity, violence, and patriarchal ideology in the region (Johansson-Nogues 2013).

This variation also reveals the need for comparative ethnographic studies that examine in more detail how masculinity is performed on the ground, and mixed method studies using both qualitative and quantitative data that compare men's experiences across the region. Although our study on MENA Muslim men's gender attitudes reveals variation, ethnographic methods can better capture the extent to which gender attitudes are linked to behavior in different conditions. Future qualitative and quantitative research can also investigate how citizens react against perceived notions of what the state stands for during times of insecurity, depending on their social positions.

Lastly, our results underscore the importance of using country-specific models rather than pooled samples across countries and regions. Although our pooled results seem to support some

of our hypotheses based on overcompensation theory, suggesting that more patriarchal gender ideology may flourish when MENA Muslim men live in conditions of economic and physical insecurity, these results are not robust in country-specific models. Results from country-specific models also undermine early findings indicating that Muslim men in the MENA countries investigated who lack political power or have an employed spouse are more gender egalitarian. Country-specific analysis enabled us to uncover complex and varied relationships between insecurity, religiosity and gender ideology of Muslim men during the Arab Spring.

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